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Implementation Dashboard · Stablecoin Desk

Guiding & Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins

The GENIUS Act Dashboard

Pub. L. 119-27 (S. 1582, 119th Cong.)  ·  Signed Jul 18 2025  ·  Rules due Jul 18 2026  ·  Effective ≤ Jan 18 2027  ·  Current as of Jun 1 2026

The GENIUS Act is the first major federal digital-asset statute, building a licensing and supervisory framework for payment stablecoins. Implementing rules must be final by July 18, 2026, and the Act takes effect 120 days after all primary regulators finalize — or by January 18, 2027, whichever is earlier. Proposed rules have now issued from the OCC, FDIC, NCUA, Treasury, and jointly from FinCEN and OFAC. The Federal Reserve — a primary regulator for state-member-bank and holding-company issuers — has not, the single largest gap in the current picture.

Senate 68–30 · Jun 17 2025 House 308–122 · Jul 17 2025 Sponsors Hagerty · Scott · Gillibrand · Lummis

Verified against OCC, FDIC, NCUA, Treasury, FinCEN/OFAC releases and the Federal Register. Verify each item before relying on it.

Rulemaking deadline
Jul 18, 2026 —
Agencies must issue final rules within 1 year of enactment. The Federal Reserve has not yet published an NPRM.
Effective date (backstop)
Jan 18, 2027 —
18 months after enactment, OR 120 days after all primary regulators finalize — whichever is earlier. Fed delay pushes toward the backstop.
Lead rule — OCC NPRM
Feb 25, 2026
376-page implementing rule (new 12 CFR Part 15): licensing, reserves, prudential standards, custody, capital, enforcement. Comments closed May 1.
3 of 4
Banking agencies with NPRMs (Fed absent)
$10B
Threshold for state vs. federal supervision
1:1
Reserve backing required (cash / low-risk assets)
Monthly
CEO/CFO-certified reserve reports required

The GENIUS Act creates three pathways to become a "permitted payment stablecoin issuer" (PPSI) — plus a registration pathway for qualifying foreign issuers. Each determines the primary regulator and applicable prudential standards.

The three issuer pathways
Pathway A — IDI subsidiary
Insured depository institution subsidiary

A subsidiary of an insured depository institution (national bank, state member bank, state nonmember bank, savings association, or credit union) authorized by its parent's federal regulator to issue payment stablecoins.

The parent's primary federal banking agency — Fed, OCC, FDIC, or NCUA depending on charter — supervises the issuing subsidiary. Capital double-counting rules prevent punitive treatment.

Regulator: parent's primary federal regulator

Pathway B — Federal nonbank (OCC)
Federal qualified issuer (FQPSI)

A nonbank that obtains an OCC charter/license under the GENIUS Act — including uninsured national banks, federal branches of foreign banks, and newly chartered nonbank issuers.

The OCC is primary regulator for all FQPSIs. This is the pathway for fintech entrants such as Erebor and the World Liberty Financial application. The OCC's Feb 2026 376-page NPRM governs it comprehensively.

Regulator: OCC

Pathway C — State qualified (≤$10B)
State qualified issuer (SQPSI)

A state-chartered entity under a state framework Treasury certifies as "substantially similar" to the federal regime. Available only to issuers with $10 billion or less outstanding.

Issuers above $10B must move to OCC supervision within 360 days or cease net new issuance (subject to a waiver pathway). The Stablecoin Certification Review Committee (SCRC) approves certifications; Treasury's Apr 2026 NPRM proposes the standard.

Regulator: state regulator (federal floor)

Foreign issuers — registration pathway
Pathway D — Foreign payment stablecoin issuer (FPSI)

Foreign issuers may distribute to U.S. persons through digital-asset service providers, subject to: (1) a Treasury determination that the home jurisdiction has a comparable framework; (2) OCC registration; (3) reserves held in U.S. financial institutions sufficient for U.S. customer liquidity; and (4) ability to comply with U.S. lawful orders including asset freezes and AML/sanctions directives. Issuers from OFAC-sanctioned jurisdictions or those designated as primary money-laundering concerns are categorically barred.

Regulator: OCC (registration/oversight) · Treasury (comparability determination)

Who is excluded
Notable restriction
Large public companies and big tech face significant barriers to issuance
A U.S. public company (and any non-U.S. company not predominantly engaged in financial activities) may not issue payment stablecoins absent a unanimous vote of the SCRC finding no material risk to safety and soundness, U.S. financial stability, or national security. That very high bar is widely read as targeting large technology companies (Apple, Google, Meta, Amazon) and other major non-financial corporations — not a categorical prohibition, but a politically demanding approval process.

Each primary federal stablecoin regulator must finalize implementing rules by July 18, 2026. The OCC, FDIC, and NCUA have issued NPRMs; Treasury and FinCEN/OFAC have issued theirs. The Federal Reserve has not — and its absence could delay the effective date or fragment the supervisory landscape.

Agency rulemaking status
OCC Comprehensive GENIUS Act implementing rule — 376-page NPRM NPRM issued Feb 25, 2026 ▼
The OCC's 376-page NPRM is by far the most comprehensive implementing rulemaking to date, establishing new 12 CFR Part 15 and amending Parts 3, 6, 8, and 19. It covers every phase of the OCC-supervised stablecoin lifecycle: FQPSI licensing; core and prohibited activities; reserves and redemption; risk management; custody; capital adequacy; supervisory fees and enforcement; and the transition framework for large state-qualified issuers ($10B+) migrating to OCC supervision. The OCC separately finalized its national trust bank (NTB) non-fiduciary activities rule on February 26, 2026 — directly relevant to entities structuring stablecoin operations under a trust charter. Published in the Federal Register March 2, 2026; the 60-day comment period closed May 1, 2026, with 200+ specific questions posed. Final rule due July 18, 2026.
FDIC Application-procedures NPRM + prudential-framework NPRM for FDIC-supervised issuers 2 NPRMs issued Dec 2025 / Apr 2026 ▼
Two GENIUS Act NPRMs. First, December 19, 2025 — application procedures for FDIC-supervised issuers (mainly subsidiaries of FDIC-supervised state nonmember banks and savings associations; comment period extended into May 2026). Second, April 7, 2026 — the prudential framework (reserves, redemption, capital, risk management), which also addresses custody/safekeeping, the applicability of pass-through deposit insurance to reserves backing stablecoins, and the treatment of tokenized deposits that meet the statutory "deposit" definition. The FDIC is considering the President's Working Group recommendations (July 2025). Final rules due July 18, 2026.
NCUA GENIUS Act implementing rule for credit-union subsidiaries NPRM issued Feb 11, 2026 ▼
Issued February 11, 2026, covering credit-union subsidiaries issuing under the IDI-subsidiary pathway (Pathway A); comments due April 13, 2026. It addresses the credit-union-specific application of GENIUS Act standards — how reserve, capital, and supervision requirements interact with the existing NCUA framework for federally insured credit unions and their subsidiaries.
FED Federal Reserve — no NPRM issued; no proposal announced Absent As of Jun 2026 ▼
The Fed has issued no NPRM or announced proposal to implement the GENIUS Act. This matters on three fronts. First, the Fed is a primary stablecoin regulator for subsidiaries of state member banks and bank holding companies — a large segment of potential Pathway A issuers. Second, the Act takes effect 120 days after all primary regulators finalize, so Fed delay directly delays the effective date for the entire framework (pushing toward or past the January 18, 2027 backstop). Third, the absence creates a potential supervisory vacuum for Fed-supervised issuers during any gap. A structural wrinkle sharpens the stakes: because uninsured national trust banks generally are not "banks" under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Fed typically lacks authority to supervise their parent companies — so the OCC's trust-charter route to stablecoin issuance can sit largely outside Fed reach, which critics argue is precisely the design. The Fed's parallel non-participation in the AML/CFT program rule NPRM suggests a broader reticence toward ceding supervisory authority under coordinated Treasury-driven frameworks. No formal explanation has been provided.
Treasury State framework "substantially similar" standard NPRM NPRM issued Apr 7, 2026 ▼
Issued April 7, 2026 (FR April 3 publication; comments due June 2, 2026), proposing principles under §4(c) for when a state regime is "substantially similar" to the federal framework — the gateway for Pathway C. The standard uses the OCC's NPRM as reference point for prudential requirements. On reserves, states may allow assets beyond those in §4(a)(1)(A) only where the OCC has approved them as "similarly liquid Federal Government-issued assets"; states may be more conservative but not more permissive. Notably, Treasury defines the "Federal regulatory framework" to include implementing rules and interpretations, not just statutory text — and disclaims any attempt to federalize state chartering, requiring only a "fair, transparent, and viable" application framework. Treasury's separate September 2025 ANPRM on the §3 licensing prohibition has not yet produced an NPRM.
Treasury ANPRM — §3 licensing prohibition, safe harbors, nonbank BSA/AML ANPRM only Sep 2025 ▼
A September 2025 Advance NPRM sought input on two topics within Treasury's exclusive mandate: (1) §3 implementation — the prohibition on issuing without a license, and certain safe harbors; and (2) BSA/AML rules for nonbank PPSIs. The second has advanced — the FinCEN/OFAC joint PPSI NPRM issued April 8, 2026 (row below). The §3 licensing-prohibition and safe-harbor piece has not advanced to an NPRM as of June 2026. Keep two April actions distinct: the April 7 FinCEN AML/CFT reform NPRM for financial institutions generally (supersedes the withdrawn July 2024 NPRM) and the April 8 FinCEN/OFAC NPRM specific to PPSIs.
FinCEN OFAC Joint NPRM — AML/CFT and sanctions-compliance requirements for PPSIs NPRM issued Apr 8, 2026 ▼
On April 8, 2026 (FR April 10; Docket FINCEN-2026-0100), FinCEN and OFAC issued a joint NPRM implementing the GENIUS Act directive to treat PPSIs as "financial institutions" under the BSA. FinCEN proposes a stand-alone framework in a new Part 1033 of 31 CFR chapter X and expressly carves PPSIs out of the MSB definition, while OFAC proposes a new part of chapter V requiring effective sanctions-compliance programs. It reaches nonbank issuers, OCC-licensed uninsured national banks and federal branches, and state-qualified issuers; program requirements are risk-based and broadly align with FinCEN's parallel AML/CFT reform proposal. A PPSI's primary regulator would notify and consult FinCEN before significant AML/CFT supervisory action. Comments due June 9, 2026; final rule effective 12 months after issuance. This fills what had been the most significant nonbank-PPSI AML gap.

The Act runs on two clocks — a rulemaking deadline of July 18, 2026, and an effective date that is the earlier of 120 days after all agencies finalize or January 18, 2027. The Fed's absence creates a real risk of the backstop controlling.

The Act imposes a comprehensive prudential framework on all permitted issuers regardless of pathway. These are the federal floor; state-qualified issuers must meet substantially similar standards under their state regime.

Select any requirement to expand
$1:1 reserve backing — full asset backing at all times
All outstanding stablecoins must be backed at least 1:1 by permissible reserve assets at all times — U.S. dollars, Treasury bills, overnight repo collateralized by Treasuries, central bank reserve deposits, and other similarly liquid federal-government-issued assets approved by the OCC. Reserves may not fund high-risk activities (proprietary trading, lending) and must be segregated from operational funds — no commingling.
✕No rehypothecation of reserve assets
Issuers may not rehypothecate reserves — no pledging, lending, or use as collateral for other transactions — keeping reserves fully available for redemption and unencumbered by other obligations. More restrictive than typical bank capital/liquidity rules, it targets a core vulnerability of prior failures (e.g., TerraUSD/LUNA, which held no equivalent asset reserves).
▦Monthly reserve reports — CEO/CFO certified under penalty of law
Issuers must publish monthly reserve-composition reports on their websites, certified by the CEO and CFO (or equivalents) under penalty of law. This turns what were voluntary disclosures by some issuers (e.g., Circle's USDC attestations) into a legal obligation with personal officer accountability. Annual audits by registered public accounting firms are also required.
✕No interest or yield to stablecoin holders
Issuers may not pay interest or yield on payment stablecoins. The OCC NPRM implements this via a rebuttable presumption targeting arrangements with affiliates and related third parties, including white-label issuance. It preserves the line between payment stablecoins and deposit-like instruments — but creates tension with DeFi yield products and may push holders to secondary yield arrangements. The ban remains contested: an April 8, 2026 White House CEA report estimated that removing it would raise bank lending by only ~$2.1 billion (~0.02%), read as putting the administration mildly on the side of permitting yield — so it may resurface in rulemaking and the market-structure legislation now in the Senate.
§Bankruptcy protections — reserves excluded from estate; holder priority
Section 11 (12 U.S.C. §5910), "Treatment of Payment Stablecoin Issuers in Insolvency Proceedings," gives holders a priority claim to required reserves in any insolvency. The mechanics run through Bankruptcy Code amendments: §507 (via §11(d)) elevates holders' claims above other claims — even ahead of administrative-expense claims; §541 excludes the stablecoins from the estate; §362 applies the automatic stay to redemption with a relief path. Two caveats: whether the reserves are categorically excluded from the estate or treated as estate property with elevated priority is unsettled and will be tested in case law; and commentators flag practical concerns (e.g., funding estate administration when reserves cannot be borrowed against). Redemption cannot be unilaterally suspended absent regulatory agreement on exceptional circumstances.
⚑AML/CFT, sanctions, and lawful-order compliance required
All PPSIs — including foreign issuers in the U.S. — must comply with applicable AML/CFT requirements, OFAC sanctions, and U.S. lawful orders including asset freezes, seizures, and blocks. Issuers from OFAC-sanctioned jurisdictions or designated as primary money-laundering concerns are categorically barred. The April 8, 2026 FinCEN/OFAC NPRM implements this — PPSIs as BSA "financial institutions" via a stand-alone Part 1033, carved out of the MSB definition, reaching nonbank, OCC-licensed, and state-qualified issuers alike. Comments due June 9, 2026. What remains genuinely outstanding is the separate §3 licensing-prohibition/safe-harbor rulemaking.
⚡Preemption of state money-transmission licensing
Federal-pathway issuers (IDI subsidiaries and OCC-licensed nonbanks) are exempt from state licensing including money-transmission laws — a major commercial advantage, letting a nationally licensed PPSI operate across all 50 states without individual state MTLs. The Act does not preempt state consumer-protection laws. State-qualified issuers (Pathway C) remain under their home-state framework by definition and must separately assess MTL exposure in other states.
◷Not a security, not a commodity — jurisdictional carve-out
Compliant payment stablecoins are excluded from the federal definitions of "security" and "commodity," carving them out of SEC and CFTC oversight — governed instead by the GENIUS Act framework and the applicable banking/financial regulator. The SEC Chair acknowledged this and asked staff to consider whether guidance is needed for SEC registrants using stablecoins for settlement and margining. Stablecoins remain distinct from deposits — not FDIC-insured, no direct Fed access — a novel category between capital-markets instruments and bank products.

The state-federal framework is among the most consequential aspects of the law for state bank supervisors. It creates a tiered system: states can supervise issuers up to a $10 billion threshold, under a federally certified "substantially similar" standard. Above that, federal supervision is mandatory.

The state qualification framework
State authority preserved (below $10B)
States can supervise issuers — with federal floor standards and a certification process
The Act preserves a meaningful role for state regulation of issuers with $10 billion or less outstanding. State-qualified issuers (SQPSIs) operate under their home-state framework — provided it is certified by the SCRC as "substantially similar" to the federal regime. This preserves the dual banking system's state-charter function in the stablecoin context, at least for smaller issuers. Most issuers other than USDC (Circle) and USDT (Tether) fall below $10B.
Key mechanism
The Stablecoin Certification Review Committee (SCRC) certifies state frameworks
The SCRC approves certification of state frameworks as "substantially similar" before SQPSIs can operate under state oversight. Treasury's April 2026 NPRM proposes the standards, using the OCC's February 2026 NPRM as the reference point for reserves, capital, liquidity, and prudential requirements. States may be more conservative than the OCC but not more permissive. The SCRC introduces a new federal review over state frameworks — raising questions about how that interacts with state sovereignty and state-federal coordination.
Critical threshold
Issuers above $10B must transition to OCC supervision — or stop net new issuance
If a state-qualified issuer exceeds $10 billion outstanding, it must — within 360 days — transition to OCC supervision or cease net new issuance, unless it obtains a waiver to remain solely under its state regulator. The statute thus contemplates a waiver pathway (turning on §4(c) and forthcoming rules), so the threshold is a rebuttable ceiling rather than an automatic federal takeover. It is denominated in outstanding issuance (tokens in circulation), not assets or revenue; in a fast-growing market an issuer could cross it quickly. The OCC NPRM provides an orderly transition under proposed §15.15. For state regulators, this — and the scope of any waiver — defines the practical ceiling of their jurisdiction.
State-federal coordination
"Substantially similar" — meet the federal floor, but retain chartering authority
Treasury's NPRM proposes that the standard does not require states to replicate the federal regime, only to achieve comparable outcomes in key prudential areas (reserves, redemption, AML/CFT, consumer protection). Treasury explicitly disclaims trying to "federalize state chartering" — states may structure licensing differently if the framework is fair, transparent, and viable. A meaningful preservation of state discretion. But states wanting full-market SQPSI access without preemption friction must still align to the OCC NPRM reference point — a de facto OCC standard-setting role even for state-supervised entities.
Notable
MTL preemption favors federal-pathway issuers over state-qualified issuers
Federal-pathway issuers (OCC-licensed nonbanks, IDI subsidiaries) get preemption of state money-transmission licensing — national operation without a state-by-state MTL patchwork. State-qualified issuers do not, remaining subject to MTL requirements outside their home state. This is a structural competitive disadvantage for SQPSIs that may push growth-oriented issuers toward the OCC pathway as they scale — potentially shrinking the effective reach of the $10B state regime over time.
Preserved
State consumer-protection laws are not preempted
The Act explicitly does not preempt state consumer-protection laws. State AGs and financial regulators retain enforcement authority over issuer conduct violating state consumer-protection statutes — even for federally chartered issuers — consistent with the NBA framework where state consumer-protection laws that don't significantly interfere with federal banking powers survive. For state regulators, this preserves an ongoing role in stablecoin oversight even where federal supervision controls the prudential framework.

Passage resolved the fundamental question — whether the U.S. would create a federal stablecoin framework. Significant implementation and policy questions remain, many shaped by the ongoing rulemakings and the charter pipeline.

Critical unresolved
Will the Federal Reserve issue an NPRM before July 18, 2026?
The Fed's absence is the largest near-term structural risk to the timeline. If it does not finalize implementing rules by July 18, 2026, it directly delays the effective date — the 120-day clock cannot start until all primary regulators finalize — and the January 18, 2027 backstop would control. Its non-participation mirrors its absence from the AML/CFT program rule NPRM and may reflect broader reticence toward FinCEN- or OCC-driven frameworks that expand other agencies' roles in Fed-supervised institutions. No formal explanation has been provided.
Largely addressed — detail pending
Nonbank PPSI BSA/AML is proposed — what remains is the §3 rule and final specifics
Once a critical gap, now substantially addressed: the FinCEN/OFAC joint NPRM (April 8, 2026) treats PPSIs (nonbank, OCC-licensed, and state-qualified) as BSA "financial institutions," with a stand-alone Part 1033 carving them out of the MSB definition. Still genuinely unresolved: (1) the separate §3 licensing-prohibition/safe-harbor rule from the September 2025 ANPRM hasn't advanced to an NPRM; (2) the PPSI rule is a proposal with comments due June 9, 2026, so final requirements and the FinCEN/primary-regulator enforcement split aren't locked; (3) the interaction between the PPSI framework and FinCEN's parallel general AML/CFT reform needs reconciling. OCC applicants have a far clearer picture than a few months ago but should track the comment process.
High-profile test case
World Liberty Financial (USD1) — stablecoin trust-bank application under OCC review
A WLF subsidiary (WLTC Holdings / World Liberty Trust Company, N.A.), affiliated with a venture co-founded by President Trump and his sons, applied January 7, 2026 for a national trust bank to issue and custody USD1. It sits in a fast-growing wave: the OCC conditionally approved national trust charters for Circle, Ripple, Paxos, BitGo, and Fidelity Digital Assets (Dec 2025), with Crypto.com, Protego, Zerohash, and others — and applications from Morgan Stanley, Stripe's Bridge, Payoneer, and Coinbase — filing in roughly the same window (about eleven firms in eighty-three days). WLF is the highest-profile test, watched both for conflict-of-interest concerns (Sen. Warren, in a May 19 2026 push, has pressed Comptroller Gould for the unredacted application and to reject it) and for a novel legal question: whether the OCC's NBA authority extends to chartering "trust" banks that perform no fiduciary activities and exist to issue and custody stablecoins. The OCC's February 2026 NTB non-fiduciary rule speaks directly to that and will shape the evaluation. The OCC is targeting 120-day decisions for preliminary conditional approval.
Litigation watch
The trust-charter route itself is drawing a legal challenge
The OCC's strategy of chartering uninsured national trust banks for stablecoin issuance is contested on the merits. Because such trust banks generally are not "banks" under the Bank Holding Company Act, their parents escape Federal Reserve supervision — which critics argue is the point, and which connects directly to the Fed-absence story. The Bank Policy Institute was reported in March 2026 to be weighing litigation against the OCC over the trust-charter approvals; it has so far held off, likely to preserve leverage in the parallel Senate market-structure negotiations (notably the stablecoin "interest" loophole), but the threat remains live. A resolved legal challenge — or a White House push for these trust banks to obtain direct Federal Reserve payments-system access — would reshape the pathway map in this dashboard.
Watch closely
Will the SCRC certification process work in practice for state-qualified issuers?
The SCRC has not certified any state framework as "substantially similar" — it cannot until Treasury's standard is final — so Pathway C is not yet operational. States wanting to participate must begin aligning statutes and rules to the forthcoming federal standard without knowing precisely what it will require. States with developed money-transmitter or virtual-currency regimes (e.g., New York's BitLicense, Wyoming's SPDI charter) are better positioned to seek early certification once the Treasury standard is finalized.
State supervisors' interest
The $10B threshold — how will it interact with the scale of the market?
The stablecoin market exceeded $240 billion in total capitalization by May 2026. (The common claim that stablecoins surpass Visa and Mastercard combined reflects raw on-chain volume, heavily inflated by automated and exchange-internal transfers; adjusted, economically meaningful volume is dramatically lower.) Tether (USDT) holds roughly two-thirds (~$160B+) and Circle (USDC) roughly a quarter (~$65B); most others fall below $10B — but a successful new entrant under state supervision could cross the threshold faster than expected. The 360-day transition window (subject to the waiver pathway) gives state regulators a defined wind-down but no guaranteed ability to retain supervision over a successful issuer — a potential structural ceiling on state authority worth attention in the comment process.
Resolved
Payment stablecoins are not securities — SEC/CFTC questions settled by statute
A practically significant clarification: compliant payment stablecoins are statutorily excluded from "security" and "commodity" definitions, resolving years of uncertainty over whether USDT/USDC were unregistered securities. The SEC's response — asking staff whether guidance is needed for registrants using stablecoins for settlement and margining — suggests focus on downstream use in securities markets rather than issuance itself, substantially reducing legal risk for entities using payment stablecoins in financial-services contexts.

Primary sources. GENIUS Act (Pub. L. 119-27, S. 1582, signed Jul 18 2025) · Treasury state-framework NPRM (comments due Jun 2 2026) · FinCEN/OFAC PPSI NPRM (Docket FINCEN-2026-0100; comments due Jun 9 2026) · OCC NPRM (FR Mar 2 2026, new 12 CFR Part 15) · FDIC prudential NPRM · NCUA NPRM (Feb 11 2026) · Treasury ANPRM (Sep 2025).

Secondary synthesis from Sullivan & Cromwell, Davis Polk, Troutman Pepper, Consumer Finance Monitor, Duke FinReg Blog, and others. Compiled for BankRegWire · informational tracker, not legal advice.